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U.S. Antitrust Aspects of the International Transfer
of Technology
by Kenneth E. Payne* and Richard L. Stroup**
International technology transfers must be undertaken with care to
ensure that neither domestic nor foreign antitrust laws are violated and
that rights in the technology are not misused. A transfer that restrains
international or domestic commerce can render legal rights to the technology unenforceable and subject the parties to lawsuits, injunctions and
liability for damages. Transferors and transferees, therefore, must be
keenly aware of antitrust and other applicable laws, such as patent misuse, and recognize the extent of their extra-territorial effect.
Technology, whether it be in the form of patents or know-how, can
be transferred by outright sale or assignment or by non-exclusive or exclusive licenses. Transfers may occur between unrelated parties or related entities, such as foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures.
Unless the transferor imposes conditions upon an outright sale or
assignment, there is little or no risk of antitrust or misuse violations. Usually, however, the transferor retains some title to his technology and, by
license, permits the transferee to use the technology. Even such licenses
pose little risk of illegality unless the licensor seeks to restrain the activities of the licensee. The limits of such restraints may be set by the antitrust or competition laws of those countries whose commerce is affected
by the transfer. The transfer therefore must be evaluated very carefully
in light of the applicable antitrust or competition laws.i
It is the purpose of this paper to consider the effect of the U.S. antitrust laws on international transfers of technology. 2 The paper will de*

Partner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farrabow & Garrett, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1959, Uni-

versity of Kansas; J.D. 1965, American University.
** Associate, Finnegan, Henderson, Farrabow & Garrett, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1970,
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I Some of the better known antitrust laws include those of the United States, Canada, the
European Economic Community, and Japan.
2 See generally VON KALINOWSKI,

ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS ch. 9

(1979); M. FINNEGAN & R. GOLDSCHEIDER, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING (1975); G.
POLLZIEN & E. LANGAN, INTERNATIONAL LICENSE AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 1973); Kirkpatrick &
Mahinka, Antitrust and the InternationalLtensing of Trade Secrets and Know-How. A Needfor Guidelines, 9 LAW AND POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 729 (1977); Wallace, Overlooked Opportunities-Making the
Most of US Antitrust Limitations on InternatzinalLicensing Practices, 10 INT'L LAW. 275 (1976);
Wallace, MultinationalPatent and Know-How Arrangements, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 791 (1970); Stern,
The Antitrust Status of Territorial Limitations in Int'l Licensing, 14 IDEA 580 (1970-71); Gibbons,
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fine transferable technology, outline the applicable U.S. antitrust
statutes and misuse doctrines and discuss their extra-territorial effect. In
addition, the paper will analyze the legality of certain restrictive provisions commonly found in international licenses.
I.

Transferable Technology

Generally, transferable technology takes two forms: patents and
know-how. Know-how, however, may be subdivided into non-secret and
secret know-how, the latter often being identified as trade secrets. These
forms of technology are all transferable, either separately or in combination.
Under U.S. law a patent can be obtained for any new, useful and
'3
unobvious "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
The owner of a U.S. patent is granted the exclusive right to make, use
and sell the patented invention for a seventeen year period.4 Foreign
patents are of similar scope though the duration of the patent rights varies from country to country.
While trade secrets 5 and non-secret know-how are not capable of
such precise definitions, both represent substantial technological assets,6
and rights to both may be enforced under the laws of the United States.
Know-how, which includes trade secrets, will for the purposes of this
article be used in a generic sense to be "practical knowledge of how to do
something with smoothness and efficiency; . . . accumulated practical
skill or expertise." '7 Typically, know-how is the knowledge of how to
make, market, distribute or sell products. Know-how can include recipes, formulas, designs, patterns, drawings, blueprints, technical records,
specifications, lists of materials, operating instructions, analytical means
for checking and controlling a process, workshop practice, market or selling experience, technical training and so forth.
Domestic TerritorialRestrictionsin Patent Transactions in the Anti/rust Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
893 (1965-66); Baxter, Legal Restrictionson the Exploitation ofthe Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysi, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966-67); Barton, Lionitations on Terrtoq, Field of Use, Quantity and Price in
Know-How Agreements with Foreign Companies, 28 U. PIr. L. REV. 195 (1966).

3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
4 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
5 The most often quoted definition of a trade secret provides trade secrets the same compositional scope as know-how.
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to

gain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). However, the Supreme Court, quoting
the above definition with approval, further explained, "the subject of a trade secret must be
secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business."
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
6 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
7 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1971).
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II. U.S. Antitrust Statutes Applicable to Technology Transfers
A number of U.S. antitrust statutes are applicable to domestic and
international transfers of technology. Legal actions may be brought
under these statutes by the U.S. Department of Justice," by the Federal
Trade Commission, 9 and by private parties.' 0 If a technology license violates these antitrust laws, a number of remedies are available. A court
can enjoin further illegal activity, hold the license to be unenforceable,
and award damages and attorneys' fees." Even if the wrongful activity
does not rise to the stature of an antitrust violation, the courts may apply
the doctrine of misuse and hold the licensed patent rights unenforceable
2
until the misuse is purged.'
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 13 are the provisions most often
applied to restraints in technology transfers. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act defines as illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trusts
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations .... ,,14 Section 2 of the Act further states that it is illegal to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations .... ,,15
Similarly applicable to restrictions in technology transfer agreements is section 5(l)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 16 This
section declares as unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce."' 17 The breadth of this section grants the Federal Trade
Commission the power to question almost any restraint.
Portions of the Clayton Act' 8 are also applicable to technology
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15a (1976).

The Department ofJustice has provided guidelines regard-

ing its enforcement policies related to national and international licensing of technology. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977)

[hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE]. See generally Fugate, The Departmentofjustice's Antitrust Guidefor
InternationalOperations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977); Timberg, The Justice Department Guidefor
International Operations; InternationalAntitrust Enforcement in Tbe Year 1978, 60 J.P.O.S. 636 (1978).,
9 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(5) (1976).
10 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
'' Scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch. 1 (1976).
12 Under the misuse doctrine, provisions which are unlawful restraints will, under equity,
defeat a patentee's or trade secret owner's right to recover from infringement, Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668-69 (1944), or avoid the payment of royalty under a
license. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). The
courts will not enforce an illegal contractual restriction or one against public policy which underlies the patent grant. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S.

680, 684 (1944). See also
Memorandum of the U.S. Department of Justice concerning Antitrust
and Foreign Commerce, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
14 Id § 1.
15 Id.§ 2.
16 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).

50,129 (1972).

'7 Id
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, 660, 3691; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).

94

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

transfers. While the Clayton Act is more limited in its application than
the statutes discussed above, it does make unlawful those restraints or
acts which substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,
such as exclusive dealing, tying of goods or services, or acquisition of
technology rights. 19

III.

Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Statutes

The U.S. antitrust laws clearly apply to licensing transactions between U.S. citizens when one or both use the technology in the United
States. Those laws also apply to the use of technology outside the territorial limits of the United States where the use has a substantial effect on
the import or export of goods or services. 20 A given international technology transfer, therefore, may be subject to the antitrust laws of the
United States as well as the law of the country or countries where the
21
technology is used.
Generally, activities which occur in a foreign country and affect
U.S. commerce are subject to the U.S. antitrust laws if there is a close
connection between the activity and its effect, the effect is substantial,
and the effect is a direct and foreseeable consequence of the activity.22
19 It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such

commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
for use, consumption or resale within the United States. . , or fix a price charge
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease,
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
20 See generally SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
355-90 (1975); Brunsvold & Farabow, The Impact of Antitrust Laws on International Licensing-Part
ZI United States Antirust Laws, I Lic. L. & Bus. REP. 41 (1978); Victor & Hood, PersonalJursdction, Venue and Service of Process in Antitrust Cases Involving International Trade- Amenability of A/ien
Corporations to Suit, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1063 (1978); Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199 (1977); Rahl,
Foreign Commerce Jursdicton of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974); Wallace, MultihationalPatent and Know-How Arrangements, supra note 2; Note, InternationalLaw--Antitrust Law--Immunities to Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
487 (1978); Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws. A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28
STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976).

21 Generally, the acts of a person are subject to the law of the foreign nation where the act
takes place. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9, Comment f (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 20, 30 (1965).

22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18

(1965).
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Using different language, the Justice Department has reasoned that the
antitrust laws are applicable when foreign transactions have "a substan23
tial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.
The courts have constructed similar tests. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 24 the Second Circuit explained that the United States
may impose antitrust liabilities "for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends. . . ." The
court considered agreements "unlawful though made abroad, if they
were intended to affect imports and did affect them .... *25
In Tinberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N T&SA. ,26 the Ninth
Circuit formulated a three-part jurisdictional test regarding the application of the Sherman Act to activities abroad. First, does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the
United States? Second, is it of such a type of magnitude so as to be
cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act? And, finally, as a matter
of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdic7
tion of the United States be asserted to cover it?2
Obviously, the U.S. antitrust laws were not intended to regulate or
control all activities in foreign countries or even those.that may have
some indirect and slight impact on U.S. imports or exports. Where the
foreign action has only an incidental, or de minimus effect on U.S. commerce, a license is not subject to U.S. antitrust laws.2 8 However, it appears that any foreign or U.S. based activity which has anything greater
than an incidental or de minimus effect on importation to or exportation
from the United States may be subject to the subject matter jurisdiction
29
of U.S. antitrust laws.
The U.S. antitrust laws do not distinguish between U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals. Licenses between U.S. citizens, between a U.S. citizen
and a foreign national or between foreign nationals may be subject to the
U.S. antitrust laws. Of course, the U.S. antitrust laws can be applied
only if a court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to the transfer
23 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 6. The Department of Justice believes its enforcement policy protects two interests: (1) the American consuming public by assuring it the benefit
of competitive products and ideas produced by foreign and domestic competitors, and (2)
American export and investment opportunities against privately imposed restrictions. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 4-5.
24 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
25 Id at 434-44.
26 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
27 Id at 615.
28 In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), the Court dismissed
an antitrust action on the basis that the alleged unlawful acts took place wholly outside of the
United States.
29 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); TodhunterMitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974), modifed, 383 F. Supp.
586 (E.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade
Cases (CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modifed, [1965] Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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and if no exemptions apply. 30 It should be recognized, however, that
every foreign owner of a U.S. patent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of at least one U.S. court for actions "affecting the patents or rights
3
thereunder." 1
IV.

Antitrust Tests Applicable to Transfers of Technology

If read literally, the U.S. antitrust laws would make almost every
condition or restriction in a technology transfer illegal. Realizing that
such an interpretation of the statutes would restrain rather than free
commerce, the courts have developed rules for judging legality, based in
part on the reasonableness of the restraint. Certain restraints are considered so pernicious that the courts have refused to consider their reasonableness in a given situation and have declared them per se illegal. But
exceptions have developed even as to the per se illegal restraints.
Initially the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 32 interpreted section 1 of the Sherman Act to render illegal
every contract or combination in restraint of trade, whether reasonable
or not. This concept was subsequently tempered in United States v. Addston Pipe &Steel Co. ,3 where Chief Justice Taft, then a circuit judge, read
a common law background into the Sherman Act and found that those
restraints which were ancillary to the main purpose of the arrangement,
and necessary to effect that purpose, were to be judged for their reasonableness. In contrast, those restraints whose sole purpose is to suppress
34
competition were considered illegal irrespective of their reasonableness.
Later, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 35 Justice White recognized
that the common law standard of reason must be used to determine the
36
legality of a contractual restraint.
30 Generally, jurisdiction over foreign persons or corporations is liberally based upon state
long-arm statutes and the court's liberal interpretation of due process.
31 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1976).
32 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
33 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modifdanda'fd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
34 The future chief justice said:
This very statement of the rule implies that the contract must be one in which
there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely
ancillary. The covenant is inserted only to protect one of the parties from the
injury which, in the execution of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may
suffer from the unrestrained competition of the other. The main purpose of the
contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently
uniform standard by which the validity of such restraints may be judicially determined.
85 F. at 282.
35 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
36 Justice White stated:
Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it
follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied
at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character
embraced by the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided.
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Combining the concepts of these and other decisions, the courts today consider a restraint permissible if the restriction or limitation is ancillary to the lawful main purpose of the contract, the scope and duration
of the limitation is not substantially greater than necessary to achieve
that purpose and the limitation is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. 37 The special nature of patents and trade secrets allows certain restraints which would otherwise be illegal. However, to render an
otherwise illegal restraint legal, the restraint must be within the technical
scope of the patent or trade secret technology, and the duration of the
restraint must not extend beyond the life of the patent or trade secret.
Thus, the scope and duration of the restraint are critical factors in analyzing the legality of any restraint imposed on technology use.
In evaluating the legality of a restraint in a patent license, the parties must determine that the restraint is "reasonabl[y] within the reward
which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure."' 38 As
stated by the court in United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc. :39
The possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee
any exemption from the provisions
of the Sherman Act beyond the lim40
its of the patent monopoly.

The analysis of the legality of a trade secret restraint is similar to
that used in regard to patent right restraints; i.e., an evaluation of the
scope and duration of the restraint. The Ninth Circuit in A. &E Plastik
Pak Co. a Monsanto Co.,4 1 explained that proprietary know-how (trade
secrets) confers upon its possessor the exclusive, although perhaps temporary, right to utilize it. The court correctly stated that restraints in a
proprietary know-how agreement do not on their face "appear to be an
agreement between competitors not to compete, for absent the licensed
know-how. . . [the licensee] is in no position to compete. '4 2 The Court
then analyzed trade secret restraints and determined that:
The critical question in an antitrust context is whether the restriction
Id at 60. The application of this rule of reason analysis was more carefully defined by Justice
Brandeis in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.
Id at 238.
37 Set Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, Licenstng Paleni and Technolog
under US Antitrust Laws, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 931, 936 (1971); ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8,
at 2-4.
38 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
39 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
40 Id at 378 (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948)).
41 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
42 Id at 714-15.
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may fairly be said to be ancillary to a commercially supportable licensing arrangement, or whether the licensing scheme is a sham set up for
the purpose of controlling
competition while avoiding the consequences
43
of the antitrust laws.
The court in Shin ipon Koki" Co. v. Irvih Indusines., Inc. ,44 reasoned

that a restraint in a know-how license should be found to be ancillary
and appropriate if:
(1) the subject matter of the license is substantial, valuable, secret
know-how;
(2) such restraint is limited to the "life" of the know-how; i.e., the period during which it retains its secrecy; and
(3) such restraint is limited
to those products only which are made by
45
use of the know-how.
It has been suggested that to apply the rule of reason to every alleged antitrust violation could overburden the judicial system. The
courts, therefore, have defined certain activities to be essentially per se
violations. 46 While per se illegal restraints have exceptions, licensing parties relying upon such an exemption should use extreme caution to be
certain that all the conditions of the exception are met.

V.

Analysis of Certain Licensing Restrictions

Typically technology licensors will attempt to restrain the licensee's
use of the technology to obtain an optimum return on the licensed tech-

nology. For example, a licensor might condition the grant of the license
upon the taking of additional products or services from the licensor. Al43 Id.

44 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
45 Id at 298 (citing Barton, supra note 2; Macdonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust
Laws, 62 MICH. L.R. 351, 379 (1964); A. & E. Plastic Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710
(9th Cir. 1968)). See also T. ARNOLD, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND MISUSE LAW
FOR LICENSOR AND LICENSEE (1979); Brunsvold & Farabow, supra note 20; Drysdale & Ste-

phens-Ofner, Know How Licensing, 123 NEW LJ. 218 (1973); Goldscheider, Encouraging the Flow of
Goods and Services and Know-How Among Nations-TheRole ofIndustrialPropery andAntitrustLaw, 18
W. RES. L.R. 1618 (1967); Payne, Trade Secret Licensing-Defnition,Durationand Dispositon, 2 Lic.
L. & Bus. REP. 123 (1979).
46 The Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), explained
that theory and its applications:
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as
well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular
restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken. Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are: price ring, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210; diisions of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe and
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, aj'd, 175 U.S. 211; group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457; and tying arrangements, International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392.
Id at 5 (emphasis added).
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ternatively the licensor might require that the licensee share its technological advances with the licensor, restrict the licensee's use of the
technology to particular territories, or restrict the use or sale of products
made by the licensee.
While optimum recovery through control is a sensible goal, a licensor's desire to obtain the greatest possible return on his technology must
be tempered by a thorough understanding of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, business goals may be attainable in various ways, some of which
may entail more antitrust risk than others.
This paper will discuss certain 4 7 restraints typically found in technology transfers and consider the courts' application of the U.S. antitrust
and misuse laws to these restraints. The license provisions discussed will
be tie-ins, tie-outs, post expiration royalties, package licensing, total sales
royalties, non-diminishing royalties, grant backs, veto powers, quantity
restrictions, field of use restrictions, territorial restrictions, and resale restrictions.
A.

Ti-ins

Basically, tying occurs when a party, using some leverage he possesses in one item, forces the taking of a second item as a condition to
obtaining the first. The first item is the "tying item" and the second,
"the tied item."' 48 Thus, a tying arrangement in a technology transfer
47 The scope of this paper does not permit a detailed discussion of all possible restraints in
a licensed agreement. Notably absent from a detailed discussion are price-fixing provisions and
no contest clauses.
Although the Supreme Court in United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926),
did not find an antitrust violation when the patentee set the price at which his manufacturing
licensee could sell a particular product, the rule of this case has been severely limited. See, e.g.,
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). The Department of Justice has stated that it views any price
limitations as an antitrust violation, and the courts since United States v. General Electric have
generally found price limitations to be illegal. See, e.g., Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire
Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956). See also United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791
(E.D. Mich. 1964), a fdby an equally divided court, 382 U.S. 197 (1965). No contest clauses were
declared to be illegal in Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) and are unenforceable.
48 The controlling standards and rationale regarding a tying arrangement are set forth by
the Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
For our purposes a tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases
a different (or tied) product. . . .Where such conditions are successfully exacted
competition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed.
Indeed, "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."

Standard of Caforrnta and Standard Statzwns V. United States, 337 U.S.

293, 305-306. They deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product
or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market. At the
same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing products. For these reasons "tying arrangements fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade." Tivne-tiayune PubhsAing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
606. They are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and a "not insubstantial" amount
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occurs when (1) the technology transferor requires or coerces the transferee to take certain products or services (tied items) as a condition for
receiving the desired technology or patent rights therein (tying item); (2)
the seller of the patented item (tying item) forces the buyer to purchase
other items (tied items) to obtain the patented items; or (3) the licensor of
technology forces the licensee to take unwanted technology (tied technology) in order to obtain a license for wanted technology (tying technology). The latter is often referred to as mandatory package licensing and
will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
The courts have found tying arrangements contrary to public policy
since they permit the transferring party to extend his technology rights
beyond their legal scope by forcing the purchase of products and services
not protected by legitimate technology rights.

49

In this manner, compe-

tition in the tied product or service is unreasonably restrained.
Tying restraints are per se illegal. When a tying arrangement exists,
sufficient economic power resides in the tying item to appreciably restrain free competition for the tied item, 50 and a not insubstantial
amount of interstate commerce is affected.
The court may presume economic power where the tying product is
patented or is a patent right itself. 5 ' That presumption, however, is suspect because in many situations patents provide little, if any, market
power. While a few decisions recognize that a patent does not necessarily
provide its owner with the requisite power, 52 the risk of such a presumption is high and should be carefully evaluated.
Despite the possible application of a per se rule to transfers of patented items or patent rights, under certain limited situations a tie may be
permissible for a limited period of time. For example, where a tie is necessary to make the patented product work properly and thereby save the
patentee from a loss of goodwill, such a tie may be permissible.5 3 Simiof interstate commerce is affected. Internaional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.

392.
Id at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
49 See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,
314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Leitch Mfg.
Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States,
298 U.S. 131 (1936); Carbice Corp. America v. American Patents Dev. Corp. 283 U.S. 27
(1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
50 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Former
II); Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1966) (Fortner I).
51 United States v. Lowe's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). See also International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947).
52 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958); Susser v. Carvel
Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. d'smissedas improvidentl granted,381 U.S. 125 (1965); Aro
Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
53 Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961). Cf Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir.
1956); Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1971); Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
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larly, the tie of a product and corresponding services may be proper
when the patented product and the corresponding service system is new
and the business, being in its formative stage, requires the tied service to
insure needed goodwill. 54 However, once the new business becomes es55
tablished the continuation of the tie will probably be illegal.
The practice of tying in patent licenses was declared a patent misuse
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co. 56 There the plaintiff held a patent on a part of a film
projector and licensed the defendant under the patent with a covenant
that the projector was to be used only with film also patented by the
plaintiff. The Court held the restraint to be in conflict with the antitrust
57

laws.

Ties occur only when the licensee is required to take unwanted
products or services; voluntary purchasing of goods or services from the
licensor is permissible. 58 Thus, coercion is not assumed from the mere
fact that the transferred technology is licensed or sold in a package or
that the licensor sells the licensee certain components for use with the
licensed technology. 59 Instead, the grant of the technology license must
be conditional, in some manner, on the acceptance of separate rights,
products or services for an illegal tie to exist. The court in Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Yuma Manufacturing Co. 60 explained:
There are three types of licensing arrangements which the courts
have treated as patent misuse: (1) tying arrangements--schemes requirzng the purchase of unpatented goods for use with the patented appara54 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aJ'd per
curtam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
55 Id at 560.
56 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
57 The Court said:

Such a restriction is invalid because such a film is obviously not a part of the
invention in the patent at suit; because it is an attempt, without statutory warrant, to continue the patent monopoly. . . and because to enforce it would be to
create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly
outside the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.
Id. at 518.
58 One possible exception is in the so-called label licensing area where the courts have
seemingly implied coercion. See Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Products, Inc., 512 F.2d 993 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), modifwtdon other grounds, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 197 1), cer. denied, 404 U.S. 1018
(1972). Another possible exception is in the implied licensing area where the owner of a patented process sells unpatented articles with the implied license to practice the process. See B.B.

Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
In the label licensing area such licensing is permissible where the component or item sold is a
material part of the invention that does not have substantial non-infringing uses. Rohm & Hass
Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979).
59 The Tenth Circuit in McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th
Cir. 1965), cer. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966), explained:
[In order to constitute a misuse, there must be an element of coercion, such as
where there has been a request by a prospective licensee for a license under less
than all of the patents and a refusal by the licensor to grant such a license.
Id at 408.
60 296 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Colo. 1969).
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tus; (2) license agreements requiring the licensee not to deal in
competitive articles; and (3) coercive package licensing---condattonbigthe
granting of a license under one patent upon the acceptance of another
and different license. Economic coercion and restraint on free competition
in unpatented articles are necessay corollartes to each of these arrangements, and thus the courts have had little difficulty in finding that the
patentee has misused his patent when
any one of these arrangements is
61
present in a licensing agreement.

A basic question is whether conditioning or coercion can exist absent a specific request by the licensee for the tying item separate from the
tied item. Several general tests for determining whether coercion should
be found have been constructed. The "request and refusal" theory finds
support in a number of cases. 62 It is generally accepted that a licensee
cannot be coerced to accept additional items or a particular license pro-

vision unless he asks for the purchase or license of something else. Where
the licensor offers the licensee a reasonable alternative, that offer will
63
substantially lessen any likelihood of a court finding coercion.
The courts have also forwarded a "protestation" concept. The
Supreme Court has characterized conditioning as the use by the licensor
of the power of his technology "to override protestations of the licensee." 64 Another court questioned "whether the provision was bargained
for or imposed and whether the licensee made 'protestations' which were
65
overridden."

There is substantial authority that to substantiate coercion there
must be protestation by the licensee and a refusal in response to the protests. 6 6 At least one court has held that the buyer must persevere long
enough in the request to feel the actual exertion of economic muscle
67
before the antitrust laws are violated.

Despite the above decisions, one court shifted the burden of proof to
Id at 1295-96 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
See, e.g., Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-log, Inc., 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 95 (1968); Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th
Cir. 1966); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
modifiedon other grounds, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972); Federal
Sign and Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1222, 1240 (S.D.N.Y.
61
62

1973); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649 (M.D. 11. 1961).
63 See Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Labs, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).

64 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969). Accord,
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974).
65 Glenn Mfg. Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970).
66 See Federal Sign and Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1222
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
dented, 383 U.S. 933 (1966); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Il1. 1961).
67 American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denid, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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the licensor to show non-coercion where a standard license was used in its
marketing scheme. In that instance the court found a general feeling in
the industry that it was "futile" to request a change in the standard license. 68 Such a shifting of the burden of proof appears to be in direct
conflict with the majority of the court decisions 69which require the party
asserting coercion to carry the burden of proof.
In conclusion, the transferor can, within reasonable bounds, use
salesmanship to sell his proposed package. However, once the potential
licensee requests a smaller package, the risk begins to rise. If a potential
licensee rejects the proposed package and requests a more limited package, the licensor should offer to license the desired technology on a reasonable economic basis. Moreover, a provision in a license agreement
that requires purchase of unpatented items or services as a part of the
licensee's obligation raises a serious question, if not presumption, of illegal conditioning. Thus, extreme care must be taken to exhibit the licensee's freedom of choice.
While the legality of tie-ins that substantially affect U.S. commerce
will be subject to evaluation under U.S. antitrust laws, not all tie-ins in
international technology transfers will have the requisite effect. The Department of Justice has stated that in the "international context, the presumption against the legality of a tie-in may not necessarily be an
absolute and the Department may, in any event, be reluctant to spend
resources on International tie-ins which do not have the tie-in effects on
U.S. commerce." ' 70 However, the Justice Department quickly and properly noted that such tie-ins may violate the antitrust or competition laws
of foreign jurisdictions where the commerce of that jurisdiction is affected.
B

Tie-outs

A tie-out is an agreement in which the technology transferor restricts his transferee's freedom to buy a competitor's product or sell competing products or services. Tie-outs are the same as tie-ins in
anticompetitive effect and have been held to be improper since they free
the transferor from competition in the tied-out product. The courts have
68 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), modifwtdper
curiam, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
69 See, e.g., Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 227 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 987 (1956); Apex Electrical Mfg. Co. v. Altofer Bros., 238 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1956) (licensor had granted 176 package licenses and over 1.5 million dollars were paid in royal-

ties); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 122 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 74 (S.D. Ind.
1959), afd, 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 211 (1961) (licensor had granted
733 coating licenses of which 463 were still in force and effect); Arthur J. Schmitt Foundation v.
Stockholm Valves and Fittings, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (plaintiff had licensed
significant U.S. supplier of a given resin covered by its package of patents). See also Ungar v.
Dunkin' Doughnuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1226 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976).
70 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 35.
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adjudged tie-outs to be per se illegal.7'
C Post-expiration Royalties
Post-expiration royalty provisions provide for the payment of royalties beyond the life of the technology rights. They are highly suspect in
patent transfers, but are permissible in trade secret transfers.
In the area of patents, the Supreme Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co. ,72
held that the exaction of use royalties after a licensed patent, or the last
patent of a package, expires, is an unenforceable assertion of monopoly
power beyond the patent grant. The Court reasoned that "the licensor
was using the licenses to project its monopoly beyond the patent period"
and concluded that "a patentee's use of a royalty agreement projecting
beyond the expiration of the patent is unlawful per se. '" 73 The Court, in
Brulotte, was not asked to find, and did not find, an antitrust violation.
Instead, it merely refused to enforce a provision requiring continued payments of royalties after the last of a package of patents expired.
While post-expiration patent use royalties are unenforceable, payments after a licensed patent expires would appear to be proper if the
royalties clearly relate to pre-expiration use. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the post-expiration collection is based upon post- or pre74
expiration activity.
Although the post-expiration use royalties regarding patents are unlawful, an arm's length agreement to pay for use of trade secrets beyond
the expiration of the trade secrets is proper. In Aronson v. Quick-Point Pencil
Co.,75 the Court sustained a contract requiring payment of royalties
based on the sale of keyholders made under licensed trade secrets for as
long as the licensees sold the keyholder. The Court found the contract
enforceable even though all secrecy in the keyholder terminated upon its
76
marketing.
71 See, e.g., Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1971); Shea v. BlawKnox Co., 388 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1968); F.C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d
373 (3d Cir. 1955); McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948); National
Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943); Columbus Automotive

Corp. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 264 F. Supp. 779 (D. Colo. 1967), afd, 387 F.2d 643 (10th Cir.
1972).
1968); Krampe v. Ideal Industries, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. I11.
72 379 U.S. 29 (1964). Accord, Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th
Cir. 1973); Pipkin v. FMC Corp., 427 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1970); Modrey v. American Gage &
Machine Co., 478 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1973).
73 379 U.S. at 32.
74 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136-37 (1969);
Modrey v. American Gage & Machine Co., 478 F.2d 470, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1973); Clayton Mfg.
Co. v. Cline, 427 F. Supp. 78 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
75 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
76 The Court reasoned that the:
Enforcement of these contractual obligations, freely undertaken in arm's length

negotiation and with no fixed reliance on a patent or a probable patent grant,
will: 'encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will
prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation

of his invention.'
Warner-Lambert PharmaId at 266, citing Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974). See also
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Since post-expiration royalties for patents are treated differently
than those for trade secrets, it may be desirable to define such royalty
payments separately where both patents and know-how are licensed.
The collection of post-expiration royalties based on a patent and knowhow license may constitute patent misuse, if the separability of royalties
between patents and know-how cannot be proven. 77 Where the patents
and know-how provisions are severable, they are separately enforceable.

78

D.

Mandatog, Package Licensing

A package license is a license under which more than one patent or
other form of technology is transferred. Both existing and future patents
can be transferred by such a patent license. Furthermore, patents and
know-how or a number of different pieces of know-how can be transferred in a package.
Package licensing is common today and is frequently used to avoid
troublesome questions of infringement, bookkeeping and renegotiation.
If such licenses are fashioned for the convenience of the parties, they are
legal. 79 If coerced, legality may depend upon the applicability of one of
the exceptions to the general rule of illegality.
The courts recognize mandatory package licensing as a form of tying. In CardinalofAdnan, Inc. v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc.,80 a suit against
a patent licensee for unpaid royalties, the court noted:
The objection to "package licensing" is based on antitrust law; to the
extent that a patentee requires a licensee to pay for additional licenses in
order to get the licenses he desires, the license agreement constitutes
a
81
"tying arrangement" which is per se illegal under antitrust law.

In most circumstances, the element of coercion is key to the legality
of a package license. Where coercion is proven, package licenses are usually illegal and unenforceable.8 2 However, limited exceptions to this rule
do exist.
ceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 1978 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aJ'd, 280 F.2d 197
(2d Cir. 1960).
77 Clayton Mfg. Co. v. Cline, 247 F. Supp. 78 (C.D. Cal. 1976); accord, Duplan Corp. v.
Deering-Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), mod&idpercunam, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.
1979).
78 Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1978).
79 Se Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Well Surveys, Inc. v. PerfoLog, Inc., 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. dnitd, 393 U.S. 95 (1968); McCullough Tool Co. v.
Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
80 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 26 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
81 Id at 29 (citations omitted).
82 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), modfedfper
cura, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979); American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268
F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959); accord, Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367
F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966). One court, in fact, found the coercive licensing of a package of patents
to constitute an antitrust violation and awarded treble damages. However, limited exceptions
to this rule do exist. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir.
1967), modidon other grounds, 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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The coercive licensing of a package of technology is not illegal if the
particular package constitutes a single product. 83 This single product
rule, however, is limited and should not be relied upon except within the
narrow limits set forth in the case law. The courts have rejected broader
single product defenses. 84 Nevertheless, analysis of a package license situation should not overlook the fact that illegal tying requires that two
separate items exist. As a matter of policy, the inclusion of additional
patents in a license that may or may not be used and paid for should not
given rise to a presumption or conclusion of mandatory package licensing. Unfortunately, the language of the courts in considering such instances has not been clear and has suggested that the royalty rate
charged for the "wanted" patents includes some increment of charge for
the "unwanted" patents or unused patents.8 5 In the words of one court,
"the willingness to throw in any number of patents for one rate . . . is
86
suspect."
E

Total Sales Royalties

Under a total sales royalty provision, the royalty for the transferred
technology is paid on the basis of the sale or use of products or services
encompassed by the transferred technology rights. For example, the licensing parties may agree to a royalty based on a percentage of the total
sales of all products sold by the transferee despite the fact that the transferred technology is used only in a portion of the products produced by
the licensee. Total sales royalties are permissible, if agreed to voluntarily.
83 In International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied
sub noma,Jacuzzi Bros. v. Tandon, Inc., 379 U.S. 988 (1965), the court affirmed the licensor's
policy of package licensing which covered only a single article. The court reasoned:
it follows that it is not an unlawful tying arrangement for a seller to include several items in a single mandatory package when the items may be reasonably considered to constitute part of a single distinct product. A license package
containing blocking patents may be considered a single distinct product since by
definition, blocking patents disclose interdependent parts of the same product.
See also North Am. Philips Co. v. Stewart Engineering Co., 319 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Standard Oil v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
84 Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), modifixdper curtam, 594
F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
85 American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir. 1959);
accord, Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), modifed per
curzam, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
86 Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1, 49 (D.
Md. 1963), afd, 327 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1964). In the author's opinion, a more proper analysis
would limit mandatory package licensing to instances where the royalty base is expanded by
coercion. In such an instance, the licensee would pay for unwanted technology or patent rights.
The licensor, by forcing such a payment, could be said to have suppressed competition in competing technologies. The tying analogy thus becomes clear. In contrast, where the royalty base
is not expanded, the inclusion of additional technology has no effect on competition. The only
effect that can be argued is that the licensee paid more in the form of a higher royalty. Such an
argument assumes too much; the royalty price paid is controlled by the market place and cannot be attributed to anything other than the payment the licensee was willing to make for that
technology he intended to use.
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The Supreme Court in Zenith Radzo Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.87
observed that a total sales royalty device may be used when the "convenience of the parties rather than the patent power dictates the total sales
royalty provision." 88 However, the Court further explained, "[w]e also
think patent misuse inheres in a patentee's insistence on a percentage-ofsales-royalty, regardless of use, and his rejection of licensee proposals to
pay only for actual use."8 9 In total sales royalty provisions, therefore, the
primary issue is whether the licensor coerced the licensee to accept a royalty base larger than that in which the technology is used. If he did, the
provision is unenforceable and may be the basis for an antitrust violation. 90 If he did not, the provision is proper. 9'
F

Non-DiminshingRoyalties

A non-diminishing royalty requires the payment of a level royalty
throughout the term of the technology license, even though some of the
technology or patents within the package expire during the term of the
license. Under the majority view, non-diminishing royalty provisions are
92
illegal only if coerced.
Two recent court decisions, however, could be read to view nondiminishing royalty provisions as analogous to post-expiration royalties
and illegal irrespective of coercion.
In Duplan Corp. v. Deerihg Miliken, Inc. ,9 the court found that the
acceptance of a package of patents was coerced. While the court did not
specifically find that the level royalty provision was coerced, it apparently believed that the effect of the provision, when combined with a
coerced package license, was to extend the royalty period until the last of
the licensed patents expired. In addition, the court may have relied on a
broad finding that the trade believed that it was futile to request any
meaningful change in the licensor's standard licensing agreement.
In Roclorm Corp. v. Actitelli-StandardConcrete Wall, Inc.,94 the court considered the problem of level or non-diminishing royalties to be more critical where one key or basic patent existed and the licensee was forced to
accept and pay royalties on numerous improvement patents until the last
improvement patent expired. The result of such coercion is to use the
87 395 U.S. 100 (1969).

88 Id at 138.
89 Id at 139.
90 324 F. Supp. 1133.
91 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 342 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher
Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Butterfield, 366 F.2d 338
(9th Cir. 1966); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Labs, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
92 Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976
(1971); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649 (10th Cir. 1965).
93 444 F. Supp. 648.
94 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966). See also cases cited in note 62 supra.
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leverage of a basic patent to require the licensee to pay royalties beyond
the basic patent's expiration for technology rights he might not have
otherwise wished to use.
G

Grant-Backs

In a grant-back provision, the transferee of the technology agrees to
grant to the transferor, in whole or in part, rights to technology developed by the transferee. The grant-back may be an assignment, or an
exclusive or non-exclusive license. It may be royalty-free or require a
royalty payment from the transferor to the transferee. The legality of
grant-back provisions is tested under the rule of reason.
The courts are not hesitant to hold unreasonable grant-back clauses
to be unlawful. 95 Furthermore, the Department of Justice has, in the
past, taken the position that an exclusive or assignment grant-back provision is unlawful. 96 Recently, however, the Justice Department indicated
that in certain competitive situations an exclusive grant-back provision
97
may be acceptable if properly limited as to technicalscope and time.
In Transparent-Wrap Machine Co. v. Stokes & Smith Co. ,98 the Supreme
Court held "that the inclusion in the license of the condition requiring
the licensee to assign improvement patents [to the licensor was] . . not
per se illegal and unenforceable." 99 However, the Court, in TransparentWrap, clearly stated that grant-backs could give rise to an antitrust violation. 100
95 See, e.g., United States v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, [1970] Trade Cases
(CCH) 73,015 (W.D. Wis. 1970); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333,
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
96 Remarks of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Sept. 21, 1972, 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,146.
97 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 43. The Department states that two factors will
probably influence its decision to challenge any exclusive grant-back. The first concern is the
technical scope of the licensee's grant-back obligation and the second concerns the competitive
relationship between the licensor and the licensee. Id
98 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
99 In considering the effects of the grant-back assignment the court reasoned:
Respondent pays no additional royalty on any improvement patents which are
used. By reason of the agreement any improvement patent can be put to immediate use and exploited for the account of the licensee. The benefit continues as
long as the agreement is renewed. The agreement thus serves the function of
supplying a market for improvement patents. Whether that opportunity to exploit the improvement patents would be increased but for the agreement depends
on vicissitudes of business too conjectural to appraise.
Id at 646.
100 The Court said:
Conceivably the device could be employed with the purpose or effect of violating
the antitrust laws. He who acquires two patents acquires a double monopoly. As
patents are added to patents, a whole industry may be regimented. The owner of
a basic patent might thus perpetuate his control over an industry long after the
basic patent expired. Competitors might be eliminated and an industrial monopoly perfected and maintained. Through the use of patent pools or multiple licensing agreements the fruits of invention of an entire industry might be
systematically funneled into the hands of the original patentee.
Id at 646-47.
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Recently, in Duplan Corp. v. DeeringMiliken, Inc. ,101 the court found
that a patent assignment grant-back provision had no adverse effect on
competition, did not preclude the only licensee involved from using its
own invention and did not discourage inventive activity. The court concluded that the grant-back clause did not constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws. 10 2 However, the court found patent misuse because the
scope of the grant-back far exceeded the scope of the licensed patents.
In conclusion, grant-backs are tested under the rule of reason. Generally a grant-back is legal if it is reasonably necessary to protect the
transferor and does not deter the incentive of the transferee to innovate,
does not extend beyond the life or the technical scope of the transferred
technology and does not otherwise unreasonably restrain competition in
the market affected by the technology.
H

Veto Power Clauses

Under a veto power clause, either the transferor or the transferee is
restrained from granting further licenses to the technology without the
express permission of the other party. Such a provision can allow a licensor and a non-exclusive licensee to control a particular market by agreeing not to license competitors in the market without first obtaining
permission from the other. Under the majority view, a veto power clause
is tested under the rule of reason. Nevertheless, the courts often view
such clauses as illegal where the parties to the transfer are in competition.
In Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc. 103 the court considered a case
where the applicant for a limited exclusive license had to secure the consent of the licensor and its licensee. The court considered evidence demonstrating that the licensor and licensee conspired to divide the market
and conflicting evidence supporting one party's assertion that sound
commercial grounds supported the veto power clause. The court re°4
manded the case, specifically rejecting the application of a per se rule.1
101 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), modifu6dper airim, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
102 Other factors which militate against an antitrust finding include whether the licensee
has the right to use, without increase in royalties, its own invention, Zajicek v. Kool-Vent Metal
Awning Corp. of America, 283 F.2d 127, 132 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961);
whether the arrangement enhances or hinders dissemination of the new technology and whether
the grant-back is within the scope of the licensed technology, International Nickel Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); and whether there is a widespread network
of such agreements between competing companies affecting an entire industry, Binks Mfg. Co.
v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. dismissed, 366 U.S. 211
(1961). Seealso McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965); Old
Dominion Box Co. v. Continental Can Co., 273 F. Supp. 550, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aJ'd, 393
F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1968); Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901
(N.D. Ohio 1959), afd in part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961);
Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Md. 1972).
103 538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1976). Accord, Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295 (6th
Cir. 1972); Old Dominion Box Co. v. Continental Can Co., 273 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
afd, 393 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1968).

104 The Court said:

On such a record, the erection of a judicial presumption that the challenged li-
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While the majority of the courts have applied the rule of reason test
to veto power clauses, one court has viewed such clauses as per se violations. In Mason City Tent & Awnzng Co. v. Clapper, 10 5 the court held that
an agreement giving a non-exclusive licensee a veto power in the selection of other licensees was violative of sections 1 and 2. In that decision
the court concluded, "[i]t cannot be successfully contended by defendants that the terms of the license agreement . . . are not, per se, violative
of section 1 of the Sherman Act .... ,,106
Regardless of whether a court applies a rule of reason or a per se test,
veto power clauses are suspect. If the purpose and effect of the veto
agreement will in
power is to permit competitors to control a market,0 the
7
all probability be declared an antitrust violation.'
1

Quantity or Volume Restrictions

Under a quantity or volume restriction provision the transferor sets
the minimum or maximum number of products that can be manufactured using the transferred technology. Such restrictions are generally
tested under the rule of reason.
Absent other restraining provisions or conspiracies, quantity or volume restrictions have been upheld as being within the patentee's or trade
secret owner's exclusive rights. 08a Furthermore, process patent licenses
containing limitations on the quantity of unpatented products which can
be manufactured through use of the process have generally been upheld
as being a reasonable limitation on the use of the process.' 0 9 However,
quantity restrictions can be illegal if the restriction is nothing more than
cense agreement was pernicious or totally lacking any redeeming economic virtue
is unwarranted. The continuing debate between patent and antitrust champions
has not so conclusively established the anticompetitive purpose or effect of a mutual agreement not to grant sublicenses that this, or any other court, can properly
eschew economic analysis and rule a priori that, upon execution, the January 19,
1961, license contract was illegal per se. Such a narrow focus on the specific terms
of a licensing arrangement would ignore the body of sophisticated legal and economic literature to the effect that truncated judicial vision has frequently upset
desirable commercial practices.
538 F.2d at 145.
105 144 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
106 Id at 767.
107 Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ind. 1958), modifed, 270
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960); Mason City Tent & Awning Co. v.
Clapper, 144 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Mo. 1956); United States v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 141 F.
1956); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951),
Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill.
a~fd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
108 See, e.g., American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir.
1934); Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1963); United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aJd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377
(1956); ef Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Wheel Co., 154 F. 358 (7th Cir. 1907),

appeal dismissed, 210 U.S. 439 (1908).

109 See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1963); Q-Tips,
Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1951), 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953), cert.
dented, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
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a guise for controlling the price of unpatented articles. 110
j

Field of Use Restrictions

In a field of use restriction, the transferor limits the product line or
industrial use to which his technology can be applied. Rather than
granting all possible uses to one licensee, the licensor may reserve some
uses .for his own exploitation, or for the exploitation of specific licensees.
In the absence of patent or trade secret rights, horizontally imposed
agreements which divide customers or markets are deemed per se illegal."' However, field of use restrictions in patent and trade secret
licenses that are imposed on manufacturing licensees are tested under the
rule of reason.
In General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric, 1 2 the Court considered licenses of patents on electronic sound amplifiers. The licensor
granted licenses to two parties for the commercial field and to a number
of non-exclusive licensees for amplifiers for home use. The Court, holding that the restriction was proper, stated that it was "reasonably within
the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to
secure." 113
Field of use restrictions in patent and trade secret licenses serve the
beneficial results of increasing royalty income, testing the feasibility of a
new field, providing the public with full use and meeting specific needs
and capabilities of a licensee. Such a restriction may permit the licensor
to select several smaller companies who specialize in limited fields rather
than seeking a larger company that has access and knowledge in a variety of fields.
Field of use restrictions imposed upon manufacturing licensees,
licensees who use the licensed technology to make products, are in general sanctioned by the courts.' 1 4 Field of use restraints imposed upon
purchasers of a patented product, however, are more suspect and are
15
governed by the rule regarding resale restrictions.'
110 See American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
111 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modifad andaJfd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aj'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aft'd, 322 U.S. 319 (1947).
112 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
113 Id at 127 (quoting United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)).
114 See, e.g.,
Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Armstrong
v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1967); Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Products, 297 F.
Supp. 489 (N.D. Ill.1968); Chemagro Corp. v. Universal Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.
Tex. 1965); Benger Laboratories, Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aftd,
317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. dented, 375 U.S. 833 (1963); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co.,
1961); Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F.
204 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill.
Supp. 901 (D. Ohio 1959), a fd zn part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denzid, 368 U.S. 890
(1961); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa.
1956); In re Reclosable Plastic Bags, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 674, 679 (U.S.I.T.C. 1977).
115 Resale restrictions will be discussed in text accompanying notes 137-155 nzfra.
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The distinction between the imposition of use restrictions on manufacturing licensees and on purchasers of the patented product was clearly
drawn by the court in UnitedStalesv. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 116 The court found
that the use restrictions imposed on the purchaser were illegal per se,
while finding similar use restrictions on manufacturing licensees to be
proper." 17 Even though field of use restrictions in patent or trade secret
licenses are generally acceptable, they are not free from attack. If a field
of use restriction is used in a covert attempt to control resale, 118 or expand the limits of the patent," 19 the provision will probably be held illegal.
K

TerritonalRestrictions

Under a territorial restriction, the transferor restricts the geographical territory in which the transferee can use the technology or market the
products made or performed by the technology. Absent enforceable patents or trade secrets, horizontal agreements between competitors not to
compete and to divide territories or markets are considered naked re0
straints of trade which are per se illegal.12
However, under federal statute, a patent owner is authorized to
"convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to
the whole or any specified part of the United States."121 Relying in varying degrees upon that provision, the courts have almost universally reasoned that domestic territorial limitations in patent licenses are legal.
116 [1976-1] Trade Cases (CCH)
117 The court said:

60,908 (D.N.J. 1976).

This argument fails to account for the existence of the patent monopoly.
The proper standard for assessing the legality of a patent license is the legitimate
scope of the monopoly. As the Supreme Court has said: '[Tihe patentee may
grant a license "upon any condition the performance of which is reasonably
within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to
secure."' General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124,
127 (1938). This idea was restated two years later in a case much relied upon by
the government, Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940).
Therein the court described the licensing powers of a patentee in the following
terms:
He may grant licenses to make, use or vend, restricted in point of
space of time, or with any other restriction upon the exercise of the
granted privilege, save only that by attaching a condition to his license he
may not enlarge his monopoly and thus acquire some other which the
statute and the patent together did not give.
Of course, where a patentee exercises his patent in an effort to expand his
monopoly beyond that reasonably implicit in the patent grant, he may collide
with the antitrust laws. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S.
20, 48 (1912). Thus, the question arises whether the limitation to specialty form
sales only contained in the Abbott license transcended the bounds of CIBA's patent on HCT. Id at 68.
118 United States v. Glaxo Group, 203 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1969), rev'don other grounds, 410
U.S. 52 (1973).
119 United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H., 426 F. Supp. 143 (D.D.C. 1976)
(non-exclusive process patent licensee's exclusive license to sell the resultant unpatented articles
cannot be enforced as a field of use restriction).
120 See cases cited in note 109 supra.
12135 U.S.C. § 261 (1975).
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The Supreme Court in United States v. General Electric' 22 explained:
The owner of a patent may assign it to another and convey (1) the

exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention in the United States
or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right or (3) the exclusive right under23the patent within and through a specified part of the
United States.'
Similarly, in Brownell v. Ketcham Wire &Mfg. Co. ,124 the Ninth Circuit held a territorial license to be valid and stated:
It is a fundamental rule of patent law that the owner of a patent
may license another and prescribe territorial limitations. 35 U.S. Code,
§ 47, provided he may 'grant and convey an exclusive right under his
application for patent or patent to the whole or any specified part of the
United States.' Substantially similar language was carried over in to 35
U.S. Code, § 261 by the revision of the patent laws. Act ofJuly 19, 1953,
c. 950 § 1, 66 Stat. 810. These sections rest on the provisions of the Constitution in Art. 1, § 8,125
Clause 8. Patent laws therefore are equally as
valid as antitrust laws.

Other courts have consistently held that domestic territorial limitations
26
are proper. 1
The courts treat territorial restraints on the use of trade secrets and
the sale of products made by the trade secrets similarly. The court in
Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Industries, Inc.,127 stated that the rule of reason
should be applied to such territorial restraints and explained the basis of
its decision:
The rationale behind the rule is that since th6 owner of a secret process,
so long as he keeps it secret, is entitled to use it or not, as he pleases, with
impunity from the antitrust laws, he should be encouraged to make it
available for the benefit of the public at large. As an incentive to the
accomplishment of this goal, and to insure him a satisfying reward for
his creative skill and diligence, he should, like the owner of a patent, be
allowed to place reasonable competitive restraints upon those to whom
he has granted the rights to use
and who, but for such grant, would be
28
unable to compete with him.'

I

The U.S. antitrust laws will, under some circumstances, permit patent or trade secret licensors to divide world territories and prohibit imports or exports to or from certain territories or countries. For example, a
licensor who has patent rights in a given country can by a territorial
122

272 U.S. 476 (1926).

123 Id at 489.

211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
at 128.
126 Set, e.g., Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1936); Blohm &
Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Md. 1972), re'adon othtrgrounds,
489 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1973); Deering, Milliken & Co. v.Tempo-Resisto Corp., 160 F. Supp. 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'don othergrounds,274 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Parker-RustProof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
127 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
128 Id at 298. See also Foundry Services v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Fowle v. Park,
131 U.S. 88 (1889); Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irwin Industries, Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 514
(N.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
124

125 Id
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restraint prohibit its manufacturing licensees in other countries from importing products into the country where the patent rights exist.
In Dunlop Co., Ltd v. Kdesey-Hayes Co., 129 the court concluded that
agreements limiting imports of a patented product to the United States
were "merely territorial licenses granted by a patentee such as are permitted by 35 U.S.C. § 261."130 The Department of Justice in its Antitrust Guide has stated that a patent is necessarily territorial in scope and
that therefore a "territorial division created explicitly by such rights is
not now regarded as being illegal in itself under the antitrust laws."''
In
Brownellv. Ketcham Wire &Mfg. Co. ,132 the court upheld a license agreement in which the foreign licensee agreed not to export any articles covered by the patent to any foreign nation and not to import any infringing
articles into the United States. However, the Attorney General's Com1 33
mittee has questioned such export restrictions.
While reasonable territorial restraints may be permissible, it may be
considered unreasonable and illegal, inter a/ia, to use territorial restraints
to divide world markets between competitors,1 34 to restrict the sales territory of an unpatented product made under a patented process, 135 or to
divide markets for subject matter outside of the confines of the patent
grant.

L

136

Resales Restriction-Exhaustionand the Rule of Reason

A resale restriction is a restriction imposed by the transferor on the
sale or use of goods made with technology after the transferee has parted
with title to the goods. For instance, the transferor may desire to place
restrictions on a person purchasing goods made by his manufacturing
licensee.
In Adams v. Burks, 137 the Supreme Court set down the "domestic

exhaustion by sale" doctrine. In that decision the Court held that the
first authorized domestic sale of a patented article exhausts the patent
rights in that article. In Adams, the defendant purchased patented coffin
lids from a licensee within the licensee's territory and used the lids
outside of that territory. An assignee of patent rights within the area of
129 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973).
130 Id at 417.
131 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 25.

132 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).
133 REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 237 (1955).
134 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afd, 332 U.S.
319 (1947); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States
v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
'35 United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 389 (D.D.C.
1978). Ste also ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 8, at 26 where the Department of Justice states
that it is established that a process patent confers no rights to restrict sales of the unpatented
product made by the process.
136 United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
137 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
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defendant's use sued for infringement. The Court held that the assignee
could not bring the action since the patent rights in the product were
exhausted by the sale. The Court reasoned that "in the essential nature
of things, when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a
machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the con'1 38
sideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.'
The courts have consistently applied the domestic exhaustion by
sale doctrine and have reasoned that an authorized sale of a patented
product fully exhausts the patentee's rights to bring suit to place restrictions based solely upon its patent's rights.' 39 Once the patent rights are
exhausted, any restraint imposed directly or indirectly against the purchaser is tested under general antitrust law as if no patent or trade secret
existed.
The domestic exhaustion by sale doctrine does, however, appear to
have some limits. For example, a patentee can license a manufacturing
licensee to make and sell the machine and can still impose use royalties
upon the purchaser.

40

Furthermore, in General Talking Pictures14

the

patentee enforced his patent rights against a purchaser who knowingly
used the patented product in a field outside of the field of use granted to
the manufacturing licensee from whom the purchaser bought the product. Arguably these sales were unauthorized sales which did not grant
the patentee full consideration for his patent. Nevertheless, it appears
that any "unauthorized sale doctrine," if such a doctrine exists, would be
limited and would not apply to innocent, good faith purchasers of patented products.
A primary consideration of a U.S. potential licensor in foreign licensing is often whether he can prevent the importation of infringing
products made by his foreign licensee. Such imports may affect his sales
appreciably in the United States.
In view of the exhaustion principle, an interesting question is
whether a U.S. patentee can stop the importation of goods by a person
who purchases the goods from the U.S. patentee's foreign licensor. Recently, the International Trade Commission reasoned that the U.S. patent rights should not be diminished by the importation of products made
by a licensee under a corresponding patent in another country. 42 Furat 456.
139 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 59
(1895); Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355 (1893); Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779
(2d Cir. 1947); American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 722 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring System Co.,
169 F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1958), afd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959).
140 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), modiftdper
curiam, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979); Cold Metal Process Co. v. McLouth Steel Corp. 41 F.
Supp. 487 (E.D. Mich. 1941), af'd, 126 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1942).
'41 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
142 In re Reclosable Plastic Bags, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 674 (U.S.I.T.C. 1977). There the
Commission reasoned that "no foreign license on the same product can interfere with the rights
138 Id
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thermore, in Griftn v. Keyslone Mushroom Farm, Inc.,143 the court held that
the sale in Italy by the U.S. patentee's foreign licensee did not exhaust
the patentee's U.S. patent rights. The court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the exhaustion ground and reasoned that the patentee could even receive what the defendant termed a
"double recovery"-a royalty under its Italian patents and a recovery for
44
infringement of the U.S. patents. 1
Pursuant to this recent case law, it appears that a patentee can bring
an action against a third party purchaser who imports infringing goods.
However, the exhaustion by foreign sale doctrine, particularly by a foreign licensee, is not clearly defined. Some courts have held that foreign
sales exhaust a patentee's rights in the product 145 while others have held
to the contrary. ' 46 The issue, therefore, may not yet be settled.
In a recent article regarding this exhaustion by foreign sale problem,
two commentators suggested the following safeguards against resale imports. First, grant the foreign licensee only rights of manufacture, use or
sale of the licensed article in particular foreign countries. Second, have
the licensee acknowledge that no rights are being granted under U.S.
patents. Third, obtain the licensee's express agreement that all foreignmanufactured products must contain a notice that the licensee has acquired no rights under U.S. patents, and that the purchase of the article
47
is subject to enforcement of outstanding and valid U.S. patent rights.1
If the patent rights are exhausted, any resale restrictions regarding
goods made by patented or unpatented technology are treated similarly.
If the restraints result in the horizontal division of markets, the restraints
are per se illegal.148 On the other hand, if the restraints are vertical, such
as restraints upon a distributor buying the products from a manufacturing licensee, the restraints are tested under the rule of reason. In Continental TE,Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,149 the U.S. Supreme Court specifically
overruled the per se doctrine enunciated in United States v. Arnold-Schwt'nn
granted a U.S. patentee by U.S. patent laws ...patent rights in the United States cannot be
diminished by the importation of reclosable plastic bags made by a licensee under a correspond-

ing patent in another country." Id. at 679. The Commission did not consider the effects of
importation by a purchaser rather than a licensor.
143199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
at 431.
Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir.
1920); Vogtlandische Maschinen-Fabrik v. Paradis, II F. Supp. 759 (D.N.J. 1935), modifed sub
nor, Reitzsch v. Paradis, 83 F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 1936); Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185 (S.D.N.Y.
144 Id
145

1885).
146 Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890); In re Reclosable Plastic Bags, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
A
674 (U.S.I.T.C. 1977); Featherstone v. Ormonde Cycle Co., 53 F. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1892); see also
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Daimler Mfg. Co. v. Conklin, 170 F. 70 (2d Cir.
1909), cert. denied, 216 U.S. 621 (1910).

147 Farabow and Brunsvold, Unied Stales Antirst Law, Internatna/License andtthe Protectionof
the United States Market-Are Th.y Compatible.?, I Lic. L. & Bus. REP. I (May 1978).

148See cases cited in note 109 supra.
149 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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and Co. 150 and stated that it is more appropriate "to return to the rule of
reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.''
VI.

Conclusion

A licensing program in the United States can, if properly constructed, avoid interference with the antitrust laws and still achieve reasonable business goals. The laws permit flexibility of approach and,
where a reasonable business justification exists, allow restraints to be imposed on the use of licensed technology.
The risks incurred in attempting to achieve particular business goals
can often be minimized by consideration of alternative avenues of approach to those goals in light of the applicable case law. Preventive
maintenance should be a key consideration whenever commencing a licensing program. Thereafter, periodic reviews should be conducted, particularly in regard to highly successful licensing operations. A low risk
course of action could, by changes in the law or the unwitting actions of
those involved, be converted to one of a high risk.

Question and Answer Period
Question: Can import laws be used to prevent importation of goods
made outside the United States in breach of a trade secret agreement?
Mr. Payne: I would say yes. If you can get jurisdiction over the entity or the individual, you can enforce the agreement in a U.S. court. In
addition, I believe that one could use ITC proceedings in this area since
this activity might be considered an unfair practice under section 337.
The ITC proceedings are interesting. They are available for patent infringement cases, and typically must be finished within a year. Extensions may be granted, however the ITC pushes you through discovery
and the final proceeding very quickly.
Question: Are reasonable, ie., non-exclusive short-term grant-back
provisions, generally acceptable and enforceable against licensees outside
the United States?
150 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
151 433 U.S. at 59. For discussion of the impact of the Sylvania decision see Note, Sylvania and
Vertical Restraihtson Distribution, 19 B.C.L. REV. 751 (1978); Potofsky, The Sylvania Case. Antitrust
Analvsis of Naon-Price VerticalRestraints, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978); Note, Sylvania and Bqyond An
Expanding Ru/e of Reasonfor Distribution Restraints, 4 J. CORP. L. 169 (1978); Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania tecision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977);
Birdwell, Exhaustion of Rights and Patent Licensing Market Restriction, 60 J.P.O.S. 203 (1978).
Prior to the Sylvania decision, courts had combined the exhaustion principle and Schwinn to

find vertical resale restrictions on patented items to be illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo
Group, Ltd., 302 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1969); American Industries Fastener Corp. v. Flushing
Enterprises, Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 722 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Furthermore, a court has recently
applied the rule of reason and found that vertical resale restrictions on patented items violated
the antitrust laws. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Industries, Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), afad, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Mr. Payne: I am not sure, but I think the answer is yes. These provisions are enforceable in the EEC. They are even enforceable in most of
the developing countries, but Mexico, Brazil and other developing countries have prohibited the exclusive grant-back. However, some countries
have also required compensation paid to the licensee whenever the licensor receives rights back from the licensee. The result of all of this is if you
have a non-exclusive or an exclusive grant-back, you may find the countryI requiring some form of compensation back to the licensee.
Questton: Is there a distinction under the antitrust laws between a
non-U.S. inventor who obtains a U.S. patent, then licenses a U.S. entity
to iuse the patent, and a non-U.S. inventor who simply licenses the U.S.
entity to use the technology without obtaining a patent?
Mr. Payne: Yes. There is a distinction to this extent. If the technology is not licensed and eventually becomes publicly available, your ability to restrict the territorial and use activities of the licensee varies,
because once information is publicly available you have lost your right to
restrict in those areas. Rather you now fall under general antitrust laws
and may well be committing per se violations of the antitrust laws. Because of section 261 of the Patent Laws, you can divide both territorially
and as to use. The same is true, I believe, of trade secrets. There is no
statute supporting this with regard to trade secrets, but the case law,
particularly Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvh Industri'es,Inc. 1, a New York state
2
case, tends to support that concept. There is also an A &EPIastic case.
Question: If a patent is held on the manufacturing process of an
item, and the item itself is patented, so that both the process for making
it and the term are patented, are there any antitrust implications with
regard to a requirement that both patents be licensed at the same time?
Mr. Pa}yne: This problem introduces the area of mandatory package
licensing. Is there a problem with requiring your licensee to take both?
Yes. If the product can be made by other processes, there may be an
attack of possible tying. If you force the licensee to take your process
patent and pay something for that process patent when in fact he could
operate under some other technology to make the product, this may be
deemed tying. There is, however, an exception to the mandatory package licensing restriction called a blocking patent exception. It typically
comes up when you have an improvement patent and a broader patent
but you cannot practice the improvement patent without infringing the
broader patent. If the licensee wants the improvement patent, then there
is nothing wrong with forcing him to take the broader patent. The same
could be true in the fact pattern presented in your question, if in order to
make the patented item, you automatically infringe the process patent.
Consequently, if you have a blocking situation where the unwanted pat186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
2 A. & E. Plastic Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
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ent is going to be infringed by what the licensee does, then there is nothing wrong with forcing him to take the unwanted patent.

